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Abstract 
In a 1999 paper, Goodwin announced ‘the transformation of transport policy in Great Britain’. His central 
point was that consensus was emerging among policy makers and academics based on earlier work 
including Transport: The New Realism, which rejected previous orthodoxy that the supply of road space 
could and should be continually expanded to match demand. Instead a combination of investment in 
public transport, walking and cycling opportunities and – crucially – demand management should form the 
basis of transport policy to address rising vehicle use and associated increases in congestion and 
pollution / carbon emissions. This thinking formed the basis of the 1997 Labour government’s ‘sustainable 
transport’ policy, but after 13 years in power ministers neither transformed policy nor tackled longstanding 
transport trends. Our main aim in this paper is to revisit the concept of New Realism and re-examine its 
potential utility as an agent of change in British transport policy. Notwithstanding the outcome of Labour’s 
approach to transport policy, we find that the central tenets of the New Realism remain robust and that the 
main barriers to change are related to broader political and governance issues which suppress radical 
policy innovation.  
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Introduction 
In 1999, Goodwin (1999) announced the ‘transformation of transport policy in Great Britain’. His central 
point was that after several years of discussion and development there appeared to be emerging a new 
consensus among policy makers and those academics/commentators who had been arguing for radical 
change in transport policy. This consensus was built around the multi-modal policy prescription reported in 
Transport: The New Realism (Goodwin et al, 1991), which rejected the previous orthodoxy that the supply 
of road space could and should be continually expanded to cater for increased demand for road transport 
(the so-called predict and provide approach). As principal architect and author of the New Realism, 
Goodwin accepted the role of lead advisor on transport to the 1997 Labour government and was 
instrumental in translating his policy approach into what would become the contents of the 1998 White 
Paper A New Deal for Transport.  
 
The New Realism represented the first wholesale intellectual re-appraisal of the objectives, roles and 
implications of UK transport policy since that underpinning Barbara Castle’s 1968 Transport Act. Its far-
reaching implications were couched in terms designed to engender broad appeal, and Goodwin’s tactic of 
casting radicalism as a means of promoting change for the good – as he put it, to promote policies that 
“make things better rather than just slow down the pace at which they get worse” (Goodwin, 1997, 
unpaginated) – ran through the pages of A New Deal for Transport. This resonated with Labour’s broader 
electioneering claim that ‘things can only get better’. By the 1990s, predict and provide was untenable 
both in theory and in practice. In Transport: The New Realism Goodwin and his co-authors contended that 
no amount of road building could be able to match supply to demand, and so the only ever feasible role 
for policy would be to effect the reverse. In government the Conservatives were struggling to deliver the 
“largest roads programme since the Romans” (DfT, 2007: para 1.7) in the face of mounting environmental 
protests and increasing constraints on public expenditure. Although fully aware of the political difficulties 
associated with opposing the status quo (Goodwin et al, 1991), Goodwin was by his own admission 
optimistic about the potential for real change in the transport sector (BBC, 2010); while there remained “a 
number of real problems in implementation, research and methodology,” he saw Labour’s “policy shift as 
genuine and firmly grounded in [a fair amount of his own] research” (Goodwin, 1999, 655).  
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By the time the Labour Party was replaced in government by a Liberal Democrat / Conservative coalition 
in 2010, the rhetoric of radicalism had disappeared, the consensus between policy makers and academics 
had weakened and Goodwin’s erstwhile optimism seemed at best misplaced (he in any event confirms 
that it had later been put under severe strain – BBC, 2010; Goodwin, 2008). Indeed, in looking back 
generally at Labour’s achievements in transport, and more specifically at the role and influence of the New 
Realism since its ‘in principle’ adoption by Labour in government, it is clear that there was only limited 
progress towards the kind of transport policy and, crucially, policy delivery that campaigners for change 
had envisaged (Docherty and Shaw, 2003, 2008; Goodwin, 1999). Successive ministers’ retreat from the 
vision articulated in A New Deal for Transport can easily be discerned from any review of the content of 
subsequent policy documents or the net result of government policies; Labour largely failed to meet even 
its own rather undemanding targets let alone more optimistic expectations (see below). There were, of 
course, exceptions, and perhaps most interesting is the experience of the devolved administrations. 
Although A New Deal for Transport was a United Kingdom White Paper, following devolution in Scotland, 
Wales, Northern Ireland and London, transport in these jurisdictions is generally no longer a matter for UK 
ministers (see Smyth, 2003; Tomaney, 2000). Characterised by Labour as providing the opportunity for 
‘local solutions to local problems’, devolution led (and continues to lead) to some widely supported 
transport policy innovations, such as the renaissance of the railways in Scotland and the globally-
significant introduction of congestion charging in London. Because our focus in this paper is the strategic 
policy context established in A New Deal for Transport, we do not explore in depth the trajectory and 
outcome of developments in the devolved territories (see instead the analysis in Mackinnon et al. (2008)), 
although key lessons from London and Scotland are referred to later in the discussion.   
 
Against this background, our main aim is to revisit the concept of New Realism and re-examine its 
potential utility as an agent of change in British transport policy. Of particular interest to us is the meaning 
and use of the term ‘realism’, and our reading of events leads us to focus on two separate but inter-related 
realisms that shape, facilitate and constrain policy outcomes. First is the transport realism that many key 
problems – congestion, pollution, poor quality public transport and so on – remained unresolved after 
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Labour’s tenure, with some of the issues originally identified as requiring action actually having got worse. 
Second is the governance realism associated with why A New Deal for Transport was not delivered. What 
were the political and governmental realities that prevented the delivery of a more sustainable transport 
system in the UK? It emerges that the New Realism was possibly too much a product of its time – fêted as 
it was when substantive change in public policy seemed possible or even likely (BBC, 2010; Smith, 2003) 
– and ultimately its radicalism led ministers to distance themselves from its policy prescriptions when the 
need to fall back on ‘familiar’ approaches in order to appease an apparently hostile electorate was all-to-
quickly required.  
 
Nevertheless, it remains our view that there is merit in advancing a normative position with regard to the 
need to promote radical transport policy change in Britain1; indeed, we find that the policy prescriptions of 
the New Realism remain largely robust. We are aware that in the UK, government and society at large 
seem to place rather limited emphasis on transport, often underplaying its significance to a whole range of 
wider public policy imperatives, and that this will impact upon the extent to which a concept such as the 
New Realism can be deployed (Docherty and Shaw 2008; Ipsos MORI 2010). But lessons from the 
devolved territories and certain localities where the governance, financing and political conditions are 
more favourable teach us not only that more can be done, but also that it is possible to build a workable 
coalition of interests – political, technical, electoral – in support of wide-ranging change in transport policy 
and policy delivery. As such, it remains possible and desirable to conceptualise, implement and sustain an 
approach to transport that builds upon New Realism as originally advanced. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section outlines the principal characteristics of the New Realism 
and the transport realities that remain after Labour’s approach to policy between 1997 and 2010. 
Discussion then turns to the governance realities of what was and was not possible to deliver, and why. 
The remainder of the paper considers the extent to which the New Realism remains a credible basis for 
y extension, other developed European countries).    
 
1 We are attracted to the longstanding view that a key role of academics active in applied social science research, and 
especially in policy analysis, is to act as mediators of the wider discourse attempting to “minimise unproductive 
political debate on the pressing political issues of the day” (Fischer, 2003, 39). 
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Transport realisms under Labour: policy aspirations and outcomes 
The Conservative government’s Roads to Prosperity White Paper in 1989 was the culmination of many 
years’ promotion (by both Left and Right) of the idea of a car-owning democracy. The ‘right to mobility’ 
supported by ready access to the private car was part of a much broader discourse of freedom, choice 
and competitive markets, but those supporting the New Realism argued that perpetuating a predict and 
provide approach could serve only to undermine these ideals, primarily because of the impact of 
congestion (Goodwin et al, 1991). In Goodwin’s (2008, 234) words:  
 
unrestricted traffic growth would grow faster than any feasible road programme, hence 
without demand management the choice between a large road programme and a small one 
would be the choice between conditions getting worse quickly, or getting worse slowly. 
 
Focusing on urban areas, this argument rested on seven main propositions: 
 
1. There is an intolerable imbalance between expected trends in mobility [i.e. Department of 
Transport traffic growth predictions of 143%] and the capacity of the transport system. 
2. This is causing problems to industry, to the environment and also to the ability of people 
to lead comfortable and fulfilling lives. 
3. The main problem is the growth in reliance on car use, which no longer succeeds in 
realising its own objectives. 
4. It is not possible to provide sufficient road capacity to meet unrestrained demands for 
movement. 
5. It is necessary to devise systems of managing demand which are economically efficient, 
provide attractive possibilities for travel for both car owners and non-car owners and give 
priority to ‘essential’ traffic (including emergency services, freight, buses and limited 
categories of need). 
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6. Policies to accomplish this are technically possible, provided they are properly 
harmonised… Expansion of road infrastructure will not be the core of transport policy. 
7. Institutional arrangements must enable a coordinated and consistent treatment of all of 
the different parts of the transport system and a ‘level playing field’ in planning and 
implementation (Goodwin et al. 1991, 3-4). 
 
The originality of the New Realism was not in its advancement of any particular policy, but in the way it 
fashioned a series of complementary actions into a coherent whole (Table 1). Headicar (2009, 113) 
suggests that the “appeal of the report lay in presenting a practicable package as an alternative ‘brand’ to 
rather tired conventional wisdom at a particularly fortuitous time.”   
 
Table 1 here 
 
Goodwin et al. (1991, 4) noted that while “not one single sentence of [the above] outline could command 
complete unanimity… the argument as a whole is close to attracting a degree of consensus that has not 
previously been part of the transport scene.” By this ‘scene’ they meant academics, practitioners, a variety 
of different stakeholder groups and, crucially, politicians: a significant proportion of the text of the New 
Realism report was devoted to quotations from their respective policy statements demonstrating this 
convergence. Although some commentators attribute the support of MPs and their advisors to a 
recognition that cutting road building was an easy means of reining in public spending in the midst of 
recession (BBC, 2010), the Labour Party’s pre-election transport document bore the title Consensus for 
Change (Labour Party, 1996) and emphasised the need to move towards a more sustainable transport 
approach.  
 
Once elected in 1997, work started on a new White Paper, the first multi-modal document of its kind for 
over 20 years. Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for Transport John Prescott was keen not to 
alienate motorists suspicious of a transport agenda predicated on sustainability and spoke of a genuine 
choice of modes for transport users. Indeed, the mantra of choice was employed as in any number of 
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around the edges” (Mackie, 2009
                                                       
other instances to appeal simultaneously to market, environmental and social welfare understandings of 
the term, and it is important to note that this can have significant impacts on transport activity: obviously 
there is the influence on transport policies themselves, but ‘choice’ in schools and ‘choice’ in hospitals, 
etc., has the potential to significantly increase vehicle miles and in this sense is largely incompatible with 
the idea of sustainable transport (see also Docherty and Mackie (2010) on the incompatibility of transport 
and land use planning policies under Labour). Nevertheless, Prescott’s deputy, Gavin Strang, warned that 
there were likely to be cuts in the road programme because “we see new roads as a last resort rather than 
a first” (DETR, 1997, 1). The alignment of expression with the New Realism report – “it is sensible to 
consider the need for new road construction last instead of first” (Goodwin et al. 1991, 139) – is 
particularly noteworthy.  
 
Prescott was famously bullish about his ability to secure modal shift (Friends of the Earth, 1997), and 
commonalities between Transport: The New Realism and A New Deal for Transport went considerably 
beyond turn of phrase. Right from the Foreword, the emphasis was on “persuading people to use their 
cars a little less – and public transport a little more” (DETR, 1998, 2) and a hugely ambitious agenda of 
integration (within and between transport modes, and with environmental, land use planning, education, 
health and wealth creation objectives and policies) capable of “increasing prosperity,” “tackling traffic 
fumes” and creating “quality places to live where people are the priority” was advanced (DETR, 1998, 9). 
Great play was made of improving public transport and information systems, but policies such as 
motorway tolling and retail parking charges did not feature in the final document despite strong hints 
during its gestation that they would. And while local authorities would be able to hypothecate revenues 
from their own road user charging initiatives to fund public transport improvements, a national charging 
scheme was not forthcoming.2 This led to debate about the extent to which the White Paper was 
genuinely radical: Goodwin (1999) was an enthusiastic champion, but some thought of it only as a “radical 
, pers. comm.) version of what the Conservatives had already proposed 
 
2 This demonstrated a lack of leadership – local authorities effectively being left to deal with the political difficulties of 
troducing this particular ‘stick’ – and twelve years on only London has an operational congestion charging scheme. 
t the same time we should restate that Transport: The New Realism focused on towns and cities – as such it never 
uggested national road charging. 
in
A
s
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in 1996 – John Major’s Conservatives had by this stage moved away from predict and provide (see 
Goodwin, 1999) – and still others accused it of “lacking the promised radicalism and vision” and being “a 
poorly focused and indecisive document” (Glaister, 2001, 3).  
 
Much has been written on the trajectory of UK transport policy under Labour, and in general terms the 
story is one of retreat from or weak application of New Realist principles and a failure to deliver on the 
‘bottom line’ components – i.e. cutting congestion and carbon dioxide emissions – of A New Deal for 
Transport (see, for example, Bulkeley and Rayner, 2003; Docherty and Mackie, 2010; Docherty and 
Shaw, 2003, 2008; Headicar, 2009; Hine, 2000; Hine and Preston 2003, House of Commons, 2010; Hull, 
2005; MacKinnon et al, 2008; Marsden, 2005; Shaw et al, 2006, 2009; Vigar, 2001; from a different 
perspective see also Glaister, 2001). This is despite increased transport spending (HM Treasury, 2009; 
see also Shaw et al, 2009), and is certainly not to say that the Department for Transport (DfT) failed to 
keep itself busy. Outputs included an array of ‘strategic’ documents, key among these being an outline of 
spending plans adding detail to the 1998 White Paper, Transport 2010: The 10-Year Plan for Transport 
(DETR, 2000), a further White Paper, The Future of Transport (DfT, 2004), a ‘discussion’ document, 
Towards a Sustainable Transport System (DfT, 2007) and finally Delivering a Sustainable Transport 
System (DfT, 2008a). Interestingly, although these documents (augmented by a welter of supporting texts 
and studies) share similarities in their overarching aims and objectives, giving the impression of a 
continuity of discourse using the language of the New Realism and the 1998 White Paper (Table 2), their 
full discussions reveal considerable shifts in opinion about how best to pursue desired outcomes. Perhaps 
most glaring is the conclusion – reached less than two years after the publication of A New Deal for 
Transport – that cuts in congestion and carbon emissions should be achieved more by increasing road 
(and other transport) capacity and making the most of improved technology than by promoting modal shift 
or other behavioural change. 
 
While the DfT may argue that such a range of publications was necessary in order to update its policy 
thinking in relation to changing circumstances, the combined – but certainly unintended – effect of the 
documents was to highlight the deficiencies in policy delivery against the government’s original objectives. 
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That these objectives never really changed implied they were not being met, and the sheepishly-titled 
Towards a Sustainable Transport System all but confirmed this in an eyebrow-raising passage in which 
the then Secretary of State for Transport, Ruth Kelly, “begins a process of debate about how we best 
ensure that our investment and policies result in real-world improvements that are both sustained and 
sustainable” (DfT, 2007, 6, emphasis added). This is an especially ironic statement given that the raison 
d’être of the Ten Year Plan was to underpin a decade of delivery, rather than (even) more debate. 
 
Table 2 here 
 
A New Deal for Transport (1998, 29) noted that part of the approach to “[m]aking a difference” would 
involve “extending the range of targets” and the “draw[ing] up of new targets – for example, for promoting 
public transport” against which Labour’s delivery of a more ‘integrated’ (by now the blanket term of choice 
rather than ‘sustainable’) transport policy could be measured. Alongside plans to build 100 new bypasses 
and fund up to 360 miles of motorway widening in addition to 40 road schemes already on the books, 
these targets were published in Transport 2010. Tellingly, targets to reduce either the number of vehicle 
journeys or the number of passenger kilometres were absent – instead only targets relating to congestion 
appeared. Goodwin (2001) was himself particularly critical of the way in which these congestion targets 
had been formulated – he recalculated the somewhat obscure indices to show that the suggested 
improvement would be invisibly small at best – and began to distance himself from the government’s 
transport policy trajectory. Any quantification of the contribution transport might make to reducing carbon 
emissions was also avoided. References to carbon dioxide also ducked the thorny issue of international 
shipping and aviation emissions, which some estimates suggest increase the UK’s emissions by up to 
25% when accounted for (Commission for Integrated Transport (CfIT), 2007). All of this was in stark 
contrast to Prescott’s claim just three years earlier that he would have failed if by 2002 there was not a 
large reduction in journeys by car (Friends of the Earth, 2000). The Secretary of State had also asserted 
that he should be judged on whether or not there was a large increase in the number of journeys by public 
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transport, and here targets to increase rail passenger kilometres (not journeys) by 50%3 and bus use by 
10% were included. There were also quantified targets referring to a range of other matters including 
quality of service and information, cycling, safety and social inclusion.  
 
The outcome of Labour’s performance against the key targets in Transport 2010 is shown in Table 3 (see 
also House of Commons, 2010). A point to note about all these targets is that in large part they relate only 
to England, excluding London: following devolution, the Scottish Government, Welsh Assembly 
Government, Northern Ireland Executive and Greater London Authority have formal competence over 
most ‘domestic’ transport policy issues (see Smyth, 2003). We have included Prescott’s 1997 claim as an 
‘overall’ target because, although by this stage it was something of an embarrassment to officials (and 
possibly to Prescott himself), it represents the essence of what Labour was attempting to achieve by 
adopting the fundamental thrust of the New Realism. While reducing congestion and relying on 
technological advances may produce economic and environmental benefits, a ‘one step forward, two 
steps back’ scenario is likely to arise without behavioural change to reduce private vehicle use: not only is 
there the problem of ‘induced traffic’ to contend with, but also the scale of carbon dioxide reductions 
required is seen as being far greater than can be delivered by technology alone (Anable and Shaw, 2007; 
Goodwin, 1996; Standing Advisory Committee on Trunk Road Assessment (SACTRA), 1994).  
 
Table 3 here 
 
In the absence of a demanding overall target, the remainder, to borrow Peter Mackie’s phrase, seems 
only ‘radical around the edges’.4 Setting out to increase rail and bus use was certainly welcome and 
represented a break from the past – the Conservatives had largely been managing decline on the railways 
and bus use had been falling for years – but the bus target was hardly ambitious even given the history of 
ing public transport patronage simply adds to the problem if there is no 
 
3 This distinction is important because an increase in passenger kilometres travelled can reflect less sustainable 
journey patterns, such as longer commuting. 
4 This perhaps exposes the contradictions in Tony Blair’s more general position statement that his administration 
would govern from ‘the radical centre’.  
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corresponding decrease in private vehicle usage because the net result is an overall increase in travel. As 
it happens, both targets will be missed, and even then there is debate over the extent to which rail 
patronage increases are attributed to the general expansion of the economy rather than to the positive 
effects of any government intervention (Preston, 2008; Wardman, 2005). Quality of service targets for rail 
and bus appear to have been met, and rail punctuality/reliability targets were eventually met after serious 
disruption to services for many years following a fatal crash at Hatfield that was attributed to poor rail 
conditions in 2000. Any reduction in the number of KSIs is obviously to be applauded and the 
longstanding general trend of safety improvement on the roads was maintained. Perhaps the biggest 
missed opportunity was that walking and cycling remained ‘Cinderella’ modes. Given that around 60% of 
car trips are under five miles in length, the chance to increase significantly the modal share of the active 
modes surely is there for the taking (see Banister and Gallent, 1998). 
 
Thus, 12 years after the publication of A New Deal for Transport, there was little movement towards either 
the kind of policy prescription advanced or the kind of policy outcome envisaged in both that document 
and Transport: The New Realism; notwithstanding a few modest successes (some of which, such as the 
‘Smarter Choices’ pilot aimed at promoting modal shift without the need for significant capital investment – 
see DfT, 2005 – do not show up in aggregate statistics), the transport realisms of rising vehicle use and 
carbon dioxide emissions remained resilient and unresolved. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the 
DfT might have more effectively deployed its resources by actually delivering policy rather than continually 
seeking to rework it. The House of Commons’ Transport Committee (2010, 22) is of the view that the DfT 
has “established a new direction in its longer term strategy. However, much remains to be done, including 
supporting economic growth, integrating local transport and tackling climate change.” We would suggest 
that the MPs are pulling their punches: under Labour the Department achieved little more than 
displacement activity.  
 
Governance and political realisms: why Labour failed to deliver 
The journalist and author Christian Wolmar has described transport as the domestic policy area in which 
Labour “least exerted itself” (Wolmar, 2008, viii) during its period in office. With post-financial crisis 
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hindsight, this might be seen as damning with especially faint praise, but his jibe is not in any way 
partisan: over the decades, governments of all political complexions – with the most notable exception of 
the Thatcher administrations – which pursued a wide-ranging agenda of privatisation and deregulation – 
have found it difficult to intervene significantly in the transport sector for a variety of reasons. Some of 
these are technical, but more usually they are related to an inability to overcome a number of longstanding 
governance and political realisms that together have created, or at least have been perceived to create, a 
formidable barrier to progress.  
 
Throughout Labour’s term in office, but especially in the first eight years of large parliamentary majorities 
underpinned by robust opinion poll support, there was an undoubted window of opportunity for John 
Prescott’s much vaunted ‘transport revolution’ (Bonsall, 2000; BBC, 2010) to bear fruit. Certainly the 
negative consequences of established transport trends and the range of policies available to tackle them 
were well understood even if Consensus for Change had only formally appeared in 1996: the economic 
consequences of the congestion arising from unfettered traffic growth had been debated since at least the 
work of Reuben Smeed in the 1960s (Dudley and Richardson, 2000; Smeed, 1964; see also Rajé, 2003; 
Raux and Souche, 2004); the impacts of the steady polarisation of society into ‘mobility-rich with access to 
a car’ and ‘mobility-poor dependent on declining public transport’ became very visible from the 1970s 
(Church et al, 2000; Kenyon et al, 2002; Schaeffer and Sclar, 1975); and the centrality of transport 
emissions to global environmental sustainability emerged very clearly following the seminal 1989 
Conference of the European Ministers of Transport (ECMT, 1989, Docherty, 2003).  
  
Some authors argue that the principal governance realism to be confronted is that the long term nature of 
transport investment, from conceptualisation through design and finance to project delivery, does not align 
well with electoral cycles (Banister, 2003, 2004; Banister et al, 2007; Cullingworth, 1997). The same 
minister is unlikely to both sanction and ‘cut the ribbon’ of a large-scale investment scheme and therefore 
quick wins – such as privatisation or providing free bus travel for the over 60s (Baker and White, 2010) – 
are often favoured. But further analysis suggests a number of important factors beyond the rhythm of the 
electoral cycle that have constrained the government’s scope for action. In Table 4, we have collated a 
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range of the pressures that influence the formulation of UK transport policy, using the standard PESTEL 
approach which focuses on political, economic, social, technological, environmental and legal factors. The 
table is by no means exhaustive (the technique itself having obvious limitations – there is no ranking of the 
importance of each individual factor given that they overlap with one another, for example), but even using 
only those factors we identify it is clear that changing the direction of transport policy is a challenge of 
considerable complexity, with forces acting on the policy system from all possible directions. Space 
permits us to dwell here on only some of the factors listed in the table, although discussion of these 
should illustrate our argument.  
 
Table 4 here 
 
Undoubtedly a significant factor is the ingrained culture of risk aversion that pervades the British civil 
service (Chapman and O’Toole, 2009; Maddock, 2002; Vandenabeele and Horton, 2008). Whitehall has 
hierarchical structures, recruitment and employment policies constructed around the notion of civil 
servants as ‘generalists’ who frequently move between posts since their transferable skills are considered 
applicable across numerous policy disciplines. This militates against deep subject knowledge and 
understanding among ‘high flyers’, despite the negative connotations of the so-called ‘cult of the 
generalist’ having been apparent for more than 40 years since the Fulton Committee’s Report Into The 
Civil Service (Fulton, 1968; see also Bovaird and Russell, 2007; Murray, 2008; Robson, 1968; Wilson, 
2008). Not unconnected is that the civil service is subject to customs and practices based on incremental 
policy development, such that there are ‘no surprises, minister’. This discourages ‘putting ones head 
above the parapet’ – at least in policy terms – among those in search of career advancement, and any 
lock-in effect is amplified given the preponderance of economists and engineers supporting ‘traditional’ 
(i.e. pro-road) approaches to transport policy in the DfT (Bovaird, 2007; Vandenabeele and Horton, 2008). 
Frequent political reorganisations of departments and their responsibilities are also unhelpful since they 
distract staff needing to acquaint themselves with new institutional arrangements and working practices 
from their principal business (Better Government Initiative, 2010). In this context it is unsurprising that 
there is little appetite to support and deliver significant change; even enthusiastic and seemingly powerful 
  15
Ministers such as John Prescott find it hard to align their policy objectives with the practices of UK public 
administration given the number of voices urging caution whenever substantial moves away from 
established arrangements are proposed (Horton, 2006; Pierre, 2000; Rhodes, 1996). 
 
The other side of this coin is the extent to which politicians themselves display caution when mindful of 
upsetting the electorate – especially motorists, since they represent the largest constituency in relation to 
transport matters – and losing votes (see Begg, 2003). A good example is the impact of the fuel tax 
protests of 2000 on public attitudes not just to transport policy but to the government in general (Cnossen, 
2005; Lyons and Chatterjee, 2002). To this day politicians of all parties remain extremely wary about 
raising the price of petrol explicitly – according to former CfIT Chairman David Begg, “the fuel duty 
protest… is still burnt on the memory of people like Gordon Brown… you cannot have a dispassionate 
conversation with the (former) Prime Minister on road pricing, congestion charging, the fuel duty escalator, 
without memories of that 2000 protest” (BBC, 2010, unpaginated) – with political parties including the SNP 
and latterly the Conservatives calling for price regulation in pursuit of electoral advantage (The Times, 
2008; Scottish National Party, 2010; Conservative Party, 2010).  
 
Important in constructing, articulating and promoting motorists’ concerns is the motoring lobby, which 
despite being characterised by Barbara Castle on becoming Minister of Transport in the 1960s as “the 
most vociferous lobby in the country” (Hamer, 1987, 5) had nevertheless become a critical set of 
‘stakeholders’ in wider economic development for New Labour by the late 1990s. The special strength and 
power of the motoring lobby emerges from its structure as two distinct but complementary groups. The 
first is the network of producer interests, from car companies and their suppliers in the engineering, 
design, vehicle service and finance sectors, that enjoys direct links to government via specialist 
representatives (such as the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders) and at the corporate level 
through the Confederation of British Industry, the Institute of Directors and other well-resourced lobbyists. 
Also active in this network is a range of other groups including the Road Haulage Association, the AA, 
RAC and the motoring press, itself a large and highly profitable part of the media, and well versed in the 
art of public relations.  
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The second group is the diverse yet cohesive and politically sensitive coalition of libertarians, enthusiasts, 
car-dependent school-run parents and others that mobilises upon sensing that the government is ‘waging 
war on the motorist’. Take the Association of British Drivers: for this subset of ‘Middle England’, a motorist 
is always a motorist – rather than sometimes a car driver but also sometimes a bus or train passenger 
and/or pedestrian (Sloman, 2006) – and the appropriate role of the state is reducible to providing those 
public services that are needed for motorists’ daily lives to be made as straightforward as possible whilst 
levying taxes at a sufficiently low rate and in such a way that they are not ‘unfair’ to those who consume 
the most. Behaviour change, a largely neutral term in the travel planning and transport policy literatures 
(see, for example, Anable et al, 2006; Chatterjee and Bonsall, 2009; Taylor and Ampt, 2003) is translated 
into the negative language of ‘social engineering’, perhaps on the basis that intervention that redistributes 
wealth or opportunity beyond currently privileged groups is by definition ‘unfair’ compared with the peculiar 
path-dependent combination of market and policy forces that shapes the status quo. 
 
As much as politicians’ wariness to take on such groups and the public opinion they purport to represent is 
damaging, it is also intriguing. Whilst empirical research on attitudes to transport and travel behaviour 
framed within a policy context often suggests that the negative externalities of the British transport system 
are a significant everyday concern – see, for example Goodwin and Lyons (2010) and CfIT’s (2002, 10) 
report on Public Attitudes to Transport in England, which notes that “three in ten members of the general 
public in England spontaneously identify transport as a main problem facing Britain today” – political 
attitudes research, especially that which seeks to identify influences on voting intention, relegates 
transport to a much lower level of priority (Table 5 and Figure 1).5 Even companies, notwithstanding the 
now received-wisdom status of CBI’s estimate of the annual cost of congestion being £20-25 billion 
(DETR, 1998), view transport as relatively inconsequential in relation to other, more substantial obstacles 
to doing business such as competition, regulation and recruitment (DfT, 2009e).6 One explanation for this 
 
5 This comparison is particularly interesting given that the same polling/research company – Ipsos MORI – carried out 
the fieldwork for both the CfIT udy and the longitudinal attitudes research cited. st
6 The authors note the methodological difficulty of discerning ‘the views of business’ since there is little control over 
who fills in the questionnaires.  
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dichotomy is that transport only registers in most people’s minds when there is an immediate crisis or 
major event – such as an air or train crash that attracts substantial news coverage and as such filters into 
general consciousness – to which they can directly relate their own everyday journey experiences. With 
specific reference to congestion, Goodwin and Lyons (2010) suggest that people have come to accept 
traffic jams as a fact of life but are also aware of the views of government and others that they have 
negative consequences (they characterise this as “well, I am not bothered myself, but it must be serious 
because everybody else says so” (7)).  
 
Table 5 here 
 
Figure 1 here 
 
Either way, it is unfortunate that ministers became scared of appearing ‘anti-car’ when in the broader 
scheme of things the scope for them to swing the balance of transport policy towards more sustainable 
approaches without affecting voter intentions may be greater than is often thought. And, ironically, the 
potential for ministers to keep backing away from ‘difficult decisions’ is only increased if they start to 
perceive that motorists have largely given up worrying about congestion (Goodwin and Lyons, 2010). 
Perhaps with its electoral success dependent on attracting and retaining the votes of the skilled manual 
and middle classes, the politics of the New Labour project were always likely to trump radical policy 
innovations. To put it mildly this is disappointing, since majorities of 179 and 167 in the 1997 and 2001 
general elections should have provided ministers with enough confidence to take at least some of the 
action necessary to promote more sustainable transport. But ignoring a problem generally doesn’t make it 
go away and sooner or later the transport realities of even worse congestion and increasing emissions will 
have to be faced; perhaps they will become electoral liabilities – political realities – in their own right. That 
current policy is not working is recognised by some at the highest levels of government: fully 45 years 
after Smeed’s (1964) report on road pricing, and 19 years after the publication of Transport: The New 
Realism, the Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit conceded that “road pricing is likely to be a highly effective 
way of resolving congestion in major urban areas” (Cabinet Office, 2009, 59).  
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Importantly, though, the extent to which Labour could have brought about sweeping reform even in the 
absence of the above factors is open to some question because of the complexity of British governance 
arrangements. Successive rounds of local government reform and the ‘hollowing out’ (Jessop, 1990) of 
the central state have resulted in extensive fragmentation of the institutional landscape in which many 
policies have to be delivered. Aligning the now vast array of public, private and voluntary sector actors and 
institutions even for relatively modest action is extremely difficult. More radical propositions such as 
congestion charging have become all but impossible. Whereas the London scheme was delivered in part 
because a single political office – the Mayor of London – possessed sufficient mandate, power and 
resources to realise pioneering policy choices (MacKinnon et al, 2008), the situation in provincial 
conurbations is rather different, as evidenced by Edinburgh and Greater Manchester’s failed referendums 
on congestion charging. In both cases fractious coalitions of local authorities were unable to provide 
enough leadership to bring about road user charging even, in Manchester’s case, with the promise of £3 
billion worth of investment in the city’s public transport system (Gaunt et al, 2008).  
 
A related point is that local authorities outside of London have been stripped of much of their capacity to 
plan a coherent network of public transport services. In conforming to the post-Thatcher belief that the 
public sector is incapable of delivery in many fields, the New Public Management (NPM) has been ever 
more relied upon to reshape public services according to the axioms of privatisation and competition. 
National Rail companies may well be subject to detailed contractual specifications with regard to the 
services they provide, but these are not especially flexible means of, for example, reacting to changing 
market conditions (witness the failure of several franchises in recent years) or coordinating public 
transport services in a travel to work area (even in London it has proven extremely difficult to roll out the 
Oyster Card system city-wide) (Anable and Shaw, 2007; Wolmar, 2005). The bus network outside of the 
capital is completely deregulated and provisions for re-regulation, namely Quality Contracts and Statutory 
Quality Partnerships, have not been pursued for a variety of reasons (Knowles and Abrantes, 2008). The 
Local Transport Act (2008) provided for the creation of Integrated Transport Authorities (ITAs) in several 
city regions which offer some potential for improvement, but the reality is that many of the more direct 
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means of intervention in the market, such as overarching public control (ownership is not necessarily an 
issue) of public transport networks, timetables and fares, remain elusive and challenging to deliver.  
 
New Realism: still a credible basis for transport strategy? 
In the context of this discussion we arrive at the question, ‘where does the experience of 1997-2010 leave 
the New Realism as a prescription for better transport policy?’ One view is that the approach has run its 
course, and that a return to a ‘tried and tested’ method is needed. In a prominent recent intervention by 
the RAC Foundation, Roads and reality: Motoring towards 2050 (the title making direct reference to the 
New Realism), Banks et al (2007) call for renewed, large scale road building so that ever-increasing 
congestion does not further damage the UK’s economic competitiveness or quality of life. While the 
authors admit that “we cannot build our way out of congestion” and that “no-one would seriously advocate 
such a policy…” (9), they go on to do just that by proposing a programme of some 600 lane-kilometres per 
year.  
 
The reason for this inconsistency is that it probably is possible to build enough roads to keep pace with 
increasing demand along the inter-urban corridors upon which the report focuses. The problem comes at 
the corridor ends – the towns and cities where traffic accumulates and disperses – and where large-scale 
capacity increases are simply not feasible, at least not without the total redesign of the settlements 
themselves and this has been widely resisted ever since the publication of Traffic in Towns nearly 50 
years ago (Ministry of Transport, 1963). Banks et al (2007, 10) admit that “we have not examined in any 
detail the problems of suburban or urban areas, which deserve separate investigation.” Subsequent 
analysis by the Cabinet Office (2009) provides some insight in this regard with the conclusion that the 
annual costs of congestion in urban areas are £8-11 billion, depending on the definition of ‘urban’ applied. 
This figure would only grow if inter-urban road capacity were to be substantially increased. The New 
Realism focused on towns and cities precisely because it is here that the effects of increased congestion 
are most acutely felt, and there is the least scope to ameliorate the problem by increasing road space. 
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More widely, the road building thesis depends on the assumptions that future demand for (road) travel will 
inexorably increase in line with past trends, and that even large-scale modal shift to public transport will 
not be enough to accommodate demand growth. Although supporting road user charging as a means of 
locking in the benefits of a significant road building programme, Banks et al (2007) remain suspicious of 
demand management, viewing it as the repression of (legitimate) economic and social activity. This is 
more than a little reminiscent of the car-owning democracy narrative of the Thatcher governments, which 
brought about the need for a New Realist approach to transport policy in the first place. Of course, starting 
with different assumptions alters the picture considerably. We would argue that it is very much within the 
gift of determined ministers to ensure that demand for transport in the future does not necessarily increase 
in line with historic trends and to make the case that managing existing demand is not in any way illiberal 
(there is some evidence in any case that car traffic is levelling off, even if overall traffic volumes are still 
rising). Much contemporary mobility, at least in the way it is currently expressed, imposes very real 
externalities on both individuals and the state (see Banister and Gallent, 1998, Glazebrook, 2009; Proost 
and Van Dender, 2008) and the scope for reducing car travel, especially over short distances, is very 
significant indeed. There is a strong case for remaining wary of arguments about ‘choice’ or economic 
imperatives where they are advanced in support of significant road-building programmes; it strikes us that 
the kind of “sophisticated policy mix” – to use the language of Sir Rod Eddington’s (2006, 6) report into the 
role of transport in the competitiveness of the UK economy – of some judicious new capacity on both road 
and rail, plus road pricing, real demand management, ‘smarter choices’, better land use planning and the 
innovative use of the ICTs unavailable when the New Realism was originally formulated, is more likely to 
deliver real improvements in accessibility and quality of life.  
 
Potter (2007) argues that Eddington’s particular blend of policies “is neither the old ‘predict and provide’ 
nor the environmentalists’ vision of ‘sustainable transport’, but a philosophy that seeks to blend elements 
of both. This helps to explain the support that this report has won from across transport’s political 
spectrum.” He goes on to suggest that the Eddington report is “a well-informed and astute blending of 
economic and environmental realities that, although far from perfect and fully worked out, does provide 
more of a coherent and pragmatic framework for transport policy than we have ever had before.” Whilst 
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1), the conventional wisdom th
                                                       
we agree with much of Potter’s analysis, a risk inherent in any pragmatic or integrative approach is, of 
course, that findings and recommendations from the report can be used in support of any number of policy 
interventions by different actors advocating different and sometimes incompatible agendas. To us, 
although much has changed since 1991 in terms of the economic, environmental and social context for 
action, the central tenet of the New Realism – that we cannot ever match supply to demand – means that 
we are still, and will remain for the foreseeable future, forced to think about ways of matching demand to 
supply. The key seems to be to unlock the necessary changes in the governance of transport in the UK 
that will make the implementation of the New Realism actually possible in practice, since it is the peculiar 
set of governance realisms shaping wider British political discourse that constrained the capacity of the 
Labour government to deliver a more sustainable transport system. Where analyses such as Banks et al’s 
(2007) and ours coincide is on the point that inactivity is the wrong response to the resilient transport 
realism of increasing demand. But it is not that the New Realism has been tried and has failed; it is rather 
that it has not really been tried at all. 
 
As things have turned out, other events have conspired to undermine the case for a return to large-scale 
road building; most obviously, there is the reality of substantially reduced public resources over the 
medium term and cuts in transport budgets have already been made. This arguably improves the case for 
a New Realist combination of policy prescriptions given that many of them are relatively cheap to deliver, 
and certainly less costly than a substantial programme of road construction. Perversely, perhaps, budget 
reductions might prove more beneficial to the transport sector than it may at first appear since they 
enforce the discipline of casting a much more critical eye over current spending priorities. This need not 
take a great deal of time and necessitate a battery of new documents from the DfT. It would be reasonably 
straightforward, for example, to re-evaluate the benefit of universal 100% concessionary fares for the over 
60s versus substantial investment in the quality of bus services themselves; equally the utility of planned 
grands projets such as Crossrail and HS2 could quickly be compared with numerous smaller schemes.7  
Perhaps, given the flurry of recent calls for “root and branch review of transport appraisal” (Forster, 2010: 
at road building offers better value for money than other transport 
 
7 Crossrail is an east-west heavy rail link across London from Essex / North Kent to Heathrow Airport / Maidenhead. 
HS2 is the proposed high speed railway line northbound from London. 
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interventions on the basis that it can save lots of people minute amounts of time could at last be subjected 
to serious review (see, for example, Lyons and Urry, 2005; Metz, 2008 and the vibrant debate that 
follows). It is also inevitable – as the Cabinet Office has recognised – that the whole issue of charging for 
road space will come back onto the agenda given the scarcity of resources for investment, and the very 
real potential of other revenue streams from instruments such as parking charges, urban fuel tax 
surcharges or payroll taxes such as the longstanding French versement transport arrangements (see 
Docherty et al 2009 for a comparison of these) might well be recognised. 
 
Despite little identifiable progress at central government level, post-devolution UK has of course produced 
several parallel political realities. Transport as an issue moved up the political agenda in Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland (MacKinnon et al, 2008), but it is in London where most progress has been made. 
Whatever wider history is eventually written about Ken Livingstone’s tenure as the UK capital’s first 
elected Mayor, his decision to introduce congestion charging and a raft of public transport improvements 
demonstrates that measures deemed too radical by central government ministers are in practice 
deliverable in the British political context (see White, 2008 for a discussion of transport developments in 
London since devolution). This was possible in London partly because of the particular geographical and 
transport characteristics already in place (Anable and Shaw, 2007), but mainly because of the very 
substantial ‘strategic capacity’ – that is the leadership, the finance, the powers, the technocracy – 
developed after devolution to enable effective movement from policy formulation to implementation 
(Gordon et al, 2004; Mackinnon et al, 2008; Sweeting, 2002). With very few exceptions – the devolved 
Scotland, which after a shaky start has invested substantially in railways, smarter choices initiatives and a 
roads programme that focuses on the safety and quality of the network rather than (just) capacity 
enhancement, being perhaps the most significant – these attributes are almost completely absent 
elsewhere. 
 
Certainly it appears that progress in developing a fresh approach to transport policy in provincial English 
cities was (and remains) hampered by the limited transfer of substantive power and fiscal responsibility 
away from the centre. This is despite a long and wide ranging debate about the role of local and regional 
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government in England (Morgan, 2007; see also Bulkeley and Rayner, 2003; Vigar, 2001). At least for the 
post-Thatcher era, the new Integrated Transport Authorities (ITAs) possess reasonably strong 
coordinating powers, but they fall a long way short both of what is commonplace in continental Europe 
where innovations such as the expansion of light rail and substantial effort into improving the public realm 
for pedestrians and cyclists are the norm, and of the position in which many of the English city regions 
would like to find themselves (pteg, 2009). In this sense, Labour neither did enough itself, nor created the 
conditions needed for others even to have the chance of developing the kind of strategic capacity now 
present in London. Consensus politics is not enough to overcome the governance realism of urban and 
regional structures that have been progressively fragmented and under-resourced (Docherty et al, 2009; 
Hambleton and Sweeting, 2004; Mawson, 2007). 
 
The road (or railway line, or bus lane, or cycle path) ahead… 
We do not deny that actually implementing a genuinely sustainable transport policy along the lines of the 
New Realism is an immensely difficult task, perhaps even a ‘wicked problem’ (Conklin, 2006; Rittel and 
Webber, 1973). But this would surely hold true for a variety of public policy areas – consider the sheer 
scope of the possible corresponding analyses of health policy, for example – and, in any case, serves to 
highlight the importance of government doing something positive about the situation rather than burying its 
head in the sand. Perhaps the gamut of forces we identify really can be reduced to the issues of timescale 
and political timidity in taking on vested interests and what is perceived to be the dominant public view, 
augmented by a civil service obsession with incremental policy making. Either way, it is difficult to avoid 
the conclusion that New Labour’s ministers were just not interested enough in promoting more sustainable 
transport to invest sufficient thought and take the political risk (such as it actually is) necessary to push for 
major change in both the amount and the manner in which we travel. None of this would surprise 
Wackernagel and Rees (1995: 64) who, writing about sustainability more generally, note that the 
“deliberate vagueness” associated with the concept is “a reflection of power politics and political 
bargaining, not a manifestation of insurmountable intellectual difficulty.”  
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In order to define a way forward, it is first necessary to make the essential step of moving on from 
diagnosing the transport problem – despite repeated analysis ad nauseam this has not fundamentally 
changed – to the (re)assertion of what might actually be done to make things better. For some it might be 
enough that some positive developments have come about due to sporadic serendipitous combinations of 
circumstances such as in London, but for us – and we suspect many others – the need to do better than 
begin the same debate every time a new minister arrives remains pressing. It may or may not be that one 
specific event will constitute the ‘tipping point’ (Gladwell, 2002) often required for radical ideas such as the 
New Realism to fully take hold, but in the meantime, there remains an outline of what an alternative future 
might look like. Thus in considering how transport policy might develop in the years ahead, we would 
argue, first, that there is a strong case for retaining a normative position in terms of where we think it 
should be going; without such a strategic vision the temptation to cherry-pick the politically-attractive quick 
wins will be overwhelming. Second, because our inability to match road supply with demand has not 
changed, the strategic vision should be based largely on New Realist thinking since this remains the most 
appropriate position yet set out. Again, it is important to state that Labour’s approach to transport did not 
fail because it identified the wrong suite of policies – rather, it failed because in government its ministers 
did not pursue that suite of policies with anything like enough vigour. 
 
Attempting to discern what will come to pass under the Coalition government is rather difficult. In many 
ways, transport is one of the areas of policy in which the two parties have least in common; many Liberal 
Democrats have strong environmental sympathies – their manifesto supported a switch of resources from 
new road building to reopening rural railways – whilst arguably the Conservatives remain the natural party 
of the motorist given their historic promotion of the car as a critical component of personal freedom 
(although as noted earlier it was John Major’s Conservative government that began the move away from 
predict and provide in the 1990s). The first pronouncements of the new government have underlined its 
split personality: the new Secretary of State for Transport, the Conservative Philip Hammond, in his first 
press conference declared an end to the ‘war on the motorist’ to the delight of the tabloids, but he also 
confirmed the cancellation of the third runway at Heathrow and confirmed that Crossrail would proceed. A 
few weeks later, the £1.1bn A14 road upgrade scheme was cancelled, and in the June 2010 Emergency 
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Budget not only were two large public transport investments approved – the renewal of the Tyne and 
Wear Metro and the extension of the Greater Manchester Metrolink – but the Chancellor George Osborne 
also announced that capital spending would be spared any further cuts than those already announced by 
Labour. He wisely noted that “an error was made in the early 1990s when the then Government cut capital 
spending too much” (HM Treasury, 2010, unpaginated). Only time will tell if these decisions herald a more 
sophisticated approach to transport along the lines of the New Realism in which targeted infrastructure 
development and other policy measures go hand-in-hand, or whether it will be business as usual after the 
impacts of the recession have played out. 
 
  
 
  26
References 
 
Anable, J and Shaw, J (2007) Priorities, policies and (time)scales: the delivery of emissions reductions in 
the UK transport sector. Area 39, 443-57.   
 
Anable, J; Lane, B and Kelay, T (2006) An Evidence Base Review Of Public Attitudes To Climate Change 
And Transport Behaviour, Department for Transport, London. 
http://www.yhub.org.uk/resources/Climate Change Micro Site/publicattitudes-
CCandtransportbehaviour.pdf
 
Baker, S and White, P (2010) Impacts of free concessionary travel: case study of an English rural region. 
Transport Policy 17, 20-26. 
 
Banks, N; Bayliss, D and Glaister, S (2007) Motoring Towards 2050: Roads And Reality. RAC Foundation, 
London. 
 
Banister, C and Gallent, N (1998) Trends in commuting in England and Wales – becoming less 
sustainable? Area 30, 331-342. 
 
Banister, D (2003) ‘Critical pragmatism and congestion charging in London’, International Social Science 
Journal 176, 249-264. 
 
Banister, D (2004) 'Implementing the possible?' Planning Theory & Practice 5, 499-501. 
 
Banister, D; Pucher, J and Lee-Gosselin, M (2007) ‘Making Sustainable Transport Politically and Publicly 
Acceptable’ in Rietveld, P. and Stough, R., (eds), Institutions and Sustainable Transport: Regulatory 
Reform in Advanced Economies. Cheltenham, England: Edward Elgar Publishing, 17-50. 
 
BBC (2010) The Derailing of Transport 2010, Radio 4, broadcast 18 January 2010. 
 
Begg, D (2003) Foreword. In Docherty, I and Shaw, J (2003) A new deal for transport? The Uk’s struggle 
with the sustainable transport agenda. Blackwell, Oxford, xiv-xvii. 
 
Better Government Initiative (2010) Good government: reforming Parliament and the executive. Better 
Government Initiative, London. www.bettergovernmentinitiative.co.uk/sitedata/Misc/Good-government-17-
October.pdf 
 
Bonsall, P (2000) Legislating for modal shift: background to the UK's new transport act. Transport Policy 7 
179-184. 
 
Bovaird, T (2007) Triggering Change through Culture Clash: The UK Civil Service Reform Program, 
1999–2005. In Schedler, K and Proeller, I Cultural Aspects of Public Management Reform, Emerald, 
Bingley 323-350. 
 
Bovaird, T and Russell, K (2007) Civil Service Reform In The UK, 1999–2005: Revolutionary Failure Or 
Evolutionary Success? Public Administration, 85(2) 301-32. 
 
Bulkeley, H and Rayner, T (2003) New realism and local realities: local transport planning in Leicester and 
Cambridgeshire. Urban Studies 40, 35-55. 
 
Cabinet Office (2009) An Analysis of Urban Transport, Cabinet Office, London. 
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/strategy/work_areas/urban-transport.aspx
 
Chapman, R and O’Toole, B (2009) ‘Leadership in the British Civil Service: An Interpretation’, Public 
Policy and Administration advance online version doi:10.1177/0952076709340510 
 
  27
Chatterjee, K and Bonsall, P (2009) ‘Editors’ Introduction to Special Issue on Evaluation of programmes 
promoting voluntary change in travel behavior’, Transport Policy 16(6) 279-280 
 
Church, A; Frost, M and Sullivan, K (2000) “Transport and social exclusion in London”, Transport Policy 
7(3) 195-205. 
 
Cnossen, S (2005) Theory and Practice of Excise Taxation: Smoking, Drinking, Gambling, Polluting, 
Driving. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
 
Commission for Integrated Transport (2002) Public Attitudes to Transport in England, CfIT, London. 
http://cfit.independent.gov.uk/pubs/2002/mori2002/mori2002/pdf/mori2002.pdf
 
Commission for Integrated Transport (2007) Transport and climate change. CfIT, London. 
 
Conklin, E (2006) Dialogue mapping: building shared understanding of wicked problems. Wiley, 
Chichester. 
 
Conservative Party (2010) Invitation to Join the Government of Britain: The Conservative Manifesto 2010, 
The Conservative Party, London. 
http://www.conservatives.com/Policy/Manifesto.aspx
 
Cullingworth, B (1997) ‘UK Government Reports’, Cities 14(5) 313-315. 
 
Department for Transport (2004) The future of transport: a network for 2030. Cmnd 6234. DfT, London.  
 
Department for Transport (2005) Smarter choices: changing the way we travel. DfT. London. 
 
Department for Transport (2007) Towards a Sustainable Transport System: Supporting Economic Growth 
in a Low Carbon World. Cmnd 7226. 
http://www.dft.gov.uk/about/strategy/transportstrategy/hmtlsustaintranssys
 
Department for Transport (2008a) Delivering a sustainable transport system: main report. DfT, London.  
 
Department for Transport (2008b) Transport statistics bulletin: Public transport statistics bulletin GB: 2008 
edition. DfT, London. 
 
Department for Transport (2009a) Transport statistics Great Britain: 2009 edition. DfT, London. 
 
Department for Transport (2009b) Transport statistics bulletin. National travel survey: 2008. DfT, London. 
 
Department for Transport (2009c) Transport trends: 2008 edition. DfT, London. 
 
Department for Transport (2009d) Factsheets: UK transport and climate change data. DfT, London. 
 
Department for Transport (2009e) Understanding business attitudes to transport. DfT, London. 
http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/scienceresearch/social/businessattitudes/
 
Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (1997) New roads as a last resort – Strang. 
Press release 216. DETR, London. 
 
Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (1998) A new deal for transport: better for 
everyone. Cmnd 3950. DETR, London. 
 
Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (2000) Transport 2010: the 10 year plan for 
transport. DETR, London.  
 
  28
Docherty, I (2003) Policy, politics and sustainable transport: the nature of Labour’s dilemma. In Docherty, I 
and Shaw, J (2003) A new deal for transport? The UK’s struggle with the sustainable transport agenda. 
Blackwell, Oxford, 3-29. 
 
Docherty, I and Mackie, P (2009) Planning for transport in the wake of Stern and Eddington. Regional 
Studies 43 online. 
 
Docherty, I and Shaw, J (2003) A new deal for transport? The UK’s struggle with the sustainable transport 
agenda. Blackwell, Oxford. 
 
Docherty, I and Shaw, J (2008) Traffic jam: 10 years of ‘sustainable’ transport in the UK. The Policy Press, 
Bristol. 
 
Docherty, I., Shaw, J., Knowles, R. and Mackinnon, D. (2009) “Connecting for Competitiveness: The 
future of transport in UK city regions”, Public Money and Management 29(5) 321-328. 
 
Dudley, G and Richardson, J (2000) Why Does Policy Change?: Lessons from British Transport Policy, 
1945-99. Routledge, London. 
 
Eddington, R (2006) The Eddington transport study: the case for change. Sir Rod Eddington’s advice to 
the government. HM Treasury, London. 
 
European Conference of Ministers of Transport (1989) Transport policy and the environment. OECD, 
Paris. 
 
Fischer, F (2003) Reframing public policy: discursive politics and deliberative practices, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford. 
 
Forster, A (2010) Calls grow for root and branch review of transport appraisal. Local Transport Today, 
541, 1. 
 
Friends of the Earth (2000) Paved with good intentions? Government transport plans. Press release. FoE, 
London. 
 
Fulton, (Lord) J (1968), Report of the Committee on the Civil Service, London: HMSO 
 
Gaunt, M; Rye, T and Ison, S (2006) Edinburgh's Congestion Charging Plans: An Analysis of Reasons for 
Non-Implementation. Transportation Planning & Technology, 31 641-661. 
 
Gladwell, M (2002) The Tipping Point How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference. Back Bay Books, 
New York, NY. 
 
Glaister, S (2001) UK transport policy, 1997-2001. Oxford Review of Economic Policy 18, 154-186. 
 
Glazebrook, G (2009) Taking the Con Out of Convenience: The True Cost of Transport Modes in Sydney. 
Urban Policy and Research 27, 5-24. 
 
Goodwin, P (1996) Empirical evidence on induced traffic: a review and synthesis. Transportation 23, 35-
54. 
 
Goodwin, P (1997) Solving congestion (when we must not build roads, increase spending, lose votes, 
damage the economy or harm the environment and will never find equilibrium). Inaugural lecture delivered 
at UCL, 23 October. www2.cege.ucl.ac.uk/cts/tsu/pbginau.htm  
 
Goodwin, P (1999) ‘Transformation of transport policy in Great Britain’, Transportation Research Part A: 
Policy and Practice, 33(7-8) 655-669. 
  29
 
Goodwin P (2001) Running to Stand Still?: An analysis of the 10 Year Plan for Transport, Campaign for 
the Protection of Rural England, London. 
 
Goodwin, P (2008) Traffic jam? Policy debates after 10 years of ‘sustainable’ transport. In Docherty, I. and 
Shaw, J. (eds) Traffic jam: 10 years of ‘sustainable’ transport in the UK. The Policy Press, Bristol. 
 
Goodwin, P and Lyons, G (2010) Public attitudes to transport. Transportation Planning and Technology 
33, 3-17. 
 
Goodwin, P; Hallett, S; Kenny, F and Stokes, G (1991) Transport: the new realism. Transport Studies 
Unit, Oxford. 
 
Gordon, I; Buck, N; Hall, P; Harloe, M and Kleinman, M (2004) “London: Competitiveness, Cohesion and 
the Policy Environment”, in: Boddy, M. and Parkinson, M. (eds) City Matters. Policy Press, Bristol 71-92. 
 
HM Treasury (2009) Public expenditure statistical analyses 2009. Cm 7630. HM Treasury, London. 
 
HM Treasury (2010) Budget statement by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Rt Hon George Osborne 
MP. HM Treasury, London. www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/junebudget_speech.htm
 
Hambleton, R and Sweeting, D (2004) US-style Leadership for English Local Government? Public 
Administration Review 64, 474-488. 
 
Hamer, M (1987) Wheels within Wheels: Study of the Road Lobby, Routledge, London. 
 
Headicar, P (2009) Transport policy and planning in Great Britain. Routledge, London. 
 
Hine, J (2000) Integration, integration, integration: planning for sustainable and integrated transport 
systems in the new millennium. Transport Policy 7, 175-177. 
 
Hine, J and Preston, J (2003) Integrated futures and transport choices: Uk transport policy beyond the 
1998 White Paper and Transport Act. Ashgate, Aldershot.  
 
Horton, S (2006), The Public Service Ethos in the British Civil Service: An Historical Institutional Analysis. 
Public Policy and Administration, 21, 32-48. 
 
House of Commons (2010) Session 2009-2010, HC76, 4 March. 
 
Hull, A (2005) Integrated transport planning in the UK: From concept to reality. Journal of Transport 
Geography 13, 318-328. 
 
Ipsos MORI (2010) Ipsos MORI issues index, March 2010. Ipsos MORI, London. http://www.international-
research.co.uk/researchpublications/researcharchive/poll.aspx?oItemId=2564
 
Jessop, B (1990) State theory: putting capitalist states in their place. Blackwell, Oxford.  
 
Kenyon, S; Lyons, G and Rafferty, J (2002) “Transport and social exclusion: investigating the possibility of 
promoting inclusion through virtual mobility”, Journal of Transport Geography 10(3)207-219. 
 
Knowles, R and Abrantes, P (2008) Buses and light rail: stalled en route? In Docherty, I and Shaw, J (eds) 
Traffic jam: ten years of ‘sustainable’ transport in the UK. The Policy Press, Bristol, 97-116. 
 
Labour Party (1996) Consensus for change: Labour’s transport strategy for the 21st century. Labour Party, 
London. 
 
  30
Lyons, G and Chatterjee, K (eds) (2002). Transport Lessons from the Fuel Tax Protests of 2000, Ashgate, 
Aldershot. 
 
Lyons, G and Urry, J (2005) Travel time use in the information age. Transportation Research Part A 39, 
257-76.  
 
Mackinnon, D; Shaw, J, and Docherty, I (2008) Diverging mobilities? Devolution, transport and policy 
innovation. Elsevier, Oxford. 
 
Maddock, S (2002) ‘Making modernisation work: New narratives, change strategies and people 
management in the public sector’, International Journal of Public Sector Management 15(1) 13 – 43. 
 
Marsden, G (2005) The multi modal transport investment plans – how they all add up. Transport 158, 75-
87. 
 
Mawson, J (2007) “Regional governance in England: past experience, future directions?”, International 
Journal of Public Sector Management 20(6) 548 – 566. 
 
Metz, D (2008) The myth of travel time saving. Transport Reviews 28, 321-336. 
 
Ministry of Transport (1963) Traffic in Towns. HMSO, London. 
 
Morgan, K (2007) “The Polycentric State: New Spaces of Empowerment and Engagement?”, Regional 
Studies, 41(9) 1237 – 1251. 
 
Murray, J (2008) “Service, Counsel & Values: Managing Strategically in the Public Sector”, in Galalvan, 
R., Murray,J. and Markides, C. (eds) Strategy, Innovation, Change, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 111-
130. 
 
Pierre, J (2000) Debating Governance: Authority, Steering, and Democracy, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. 
 
Potter, S (2007) Eddington – another New Realism for transport? Town and Country Planning 76, 24-25. 
 
Preston, J (2008) Is Labour delivering a sustainable railway? In Docherty, I and Shaw, J (eds) Traffic jam: 
ten years of ‘sustainable’ transport in the UK. The Policy Press, Bristol, 75-96. 
 
Proost, S and Van Dender, K (2008) Optimal urban transport pricing in the presence of congestion, 
economies of density and costly public funds. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice 42, 
1220-1230. 
 
pteg (2009) Transport works: a case for investing in the city regions. pteg, Leeds. 
http://www.pteg.net/NR/rdonlyres/95A19BB0-7D4E-4766-9BDE-
9C4E8F2C8B0F/0/TransportWorksfinalversion.pdf
 
Rajé, F (2003) The impact of transport on social exclusion processes with specific emphasis on road user 
charging. Transport Policy 10, 321-338. 
 
Raux, C and Souche, S (2004) The Acceptability of Urban Road Pricing: A Theoretical Analysis Applied to 
Experience in Lyon. Journal of Transport Economics and Policy 38(2) 191-215. 
 
Rhodes, R (1996) From Institutions to Dogma: Tradition, Eclecticism, and Ideology in the Study of British 
Public Administration Public Administration Review 56  
 
Rittel, H and Webber, M (1973) Dilemmas in a general theory of planning. Policy Sciences 4, 155-169. 
 
  31
Robson, W (1968) The Fulton Report on the Civil Service. Political Quarterly 39, 397-414. 
 
Schaeffer, K and Sclar, E (1975) Access for all: transportation and urban growth. Penguin, London. 
 
Scottish National Party (2010) Elect a Local Champion: Westminster 2010 Manifesto, SNP, Edinburgh. 
 
Shaw, J; MacKinnon, D and Docherty, I (2009) Divergence or Convergence? Devolution and Transport 
policy in the United Kingdom. Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 27, 546-567. 
 
Shaw, J; Hunter, C and Gray, D (2006) Disintegrated transport policy: the multimodal studies process in 
England. Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 24, 575-596. 
 
Sloman, L (2006) Car Sick: Solutions for Our Car-addicted Culture, Green Books, Totnes. 
 
Smeed, R (1964) Road pricing: the economic and technical possibilities, HMSO, London. 
 
Smith, T (2003) Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed, Something Blue: Themes of Tony 
Blair and his Government. Parliamentary Affairs 56, 580-596. 
 
Smyth, A (2003) Devoluation and sustainable transport. In Docherty, I. and Shaw, J. (eds) A new deal for 
transport? The UK’s struggle with the sustainable transport agenda. Blackwell, Oxford, 229-244. 
 
Standing Advisory Committee on Trunk Road Assessment (1994) Trunk roads and the generation of 
traffic. HMSO, London.  
 
Sweeting, D (2002) Leadership in urban governance: The Mayor of London. Local Government Studies 
28, 3-20. 
 
Taylor, M and Ampt, E (2003) Travelling smarter down under: policies for voluntary travel behaviour 
change in Australia. Transport Policy 10, 165-177. 
 
The Times (2008) Angry hauliers descend on capital in fuel price protest, 2 July 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article4253402.ece
 
Tomaney, J (2000) End of the Empire State? New Labour and devolution in the United Kingdom. 
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 24, 675-688. 
 
Vanderabeele, W and Horton, S (2008) The evolution of the British public service ethos: a historical 
institutional approach to explaining continuity and change. In Ethics and integrity of governance: 
perspectives across frontiers, Edward Elgar, London 7-24. 
 
Vigar, G (2001) Implementing transport’s new realism’? The dissemination of demand-management 
policies in UK transport planning. Town Planning Review, 72, 423-443. 
 
Wackernagel, M and Rees, W (1995) One ecological footprint: reducing human impact on the earth. New 
Society Publishers, Gabricola. 
 
Wardman, M (2005) Demand for rail travel and the effects of external factors. Institute for Transport 
Studies, University of Leeds. 
 
White, P (2008) Transport for London: success despite Labour? In Shaw, J and Docherty, I (eds) Traffic 
jam: ten years of ‘sustainable’ transport in the UK. The Policy Press, Bristol, 183-204. 
 
Wilson, R (2008) Policy Analysis as Policy Advice. In Moran, M; Rein, M and Goodin, R The Oxford 
Handbook of Public Policy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 152-168. 
 
  32
Wolmar, C (2005) On the wrong line: how ideology and incompetence wrecked Britain’s railways. Aurym 
Books, London. 
 
Wolmar, C (2008) Foreword, in Docherty, I. and Shaw, J. (eds) Traffic jam: 10 years of ‘sustainable’ 
transport in the UK. The Policy Press, Bristol, viii-x. 
  33
 
Headline policy  Policy elements Further details 
Land use planning  Journeys need to be shorter; less reliance 
on polluting and congesting modes; site 
facilities closer to people 
Traffic calming  Motor vehicles to lose their dominance in 
situations where they have become a 
nuisance and a danger 
Road pricing  Schemes to be local in nature; benefits from 
schemes might be divided between 
environmental improvement, extra traffic and 
higher speeds (on-road) and between 
general taxation, roads and public transport 
(net expenditure). Whatever, road pricing 
only makes sense as part of a ‘total 
transport package’ 
Traffic control Traffic management 
 
 
 
 
 
Informatics 
Making the best use of existing infrastructure 
through: stronger enforcement of existing 
restrictions, prioritising efficient vehicles 
such as buses, effective safety margins 
between traffic flow and capacity, and 
balanced parking provision 
Could be used to increase 
capacity/efficiency of current networks (or 
reduce the amount of traffic. But only as 
effective as general policy context 
Public transport Information 
 
Light rail 
 
 
New bus designs 
 
Ticketing methods 
 
Bus priorities 
 
Park and ride 
 
Personal security 
 
 
 
Financing 
General awareness-raising campaigns and 
better in-service information 
Better targeted at large cities where capacity 
and speed benefits more attractive set 
against costs 
Guided buses, hybrid fuels, trolley buses 
and low-floor buses. 
Pre-board payment and simple ticketing 
systems 
Bus lanes, selective vehicle detection at 
traffic signals, reserved busways 
Must be cheaper, more convenient and 
faster than driving 
‘Safe areas’ in city centres at night, 
conductors, CCTV etc. Transport part of the 
problem but danger and violence need to be 
tackled in a broader policy context too 
Change the balance of costs borne by less-
efficient modes (cars) to more efficient 
modes (public transport) 
Walking  Maintain local shops and services, prioritise 
pedestrians over vehicles in certain areas, 
better maintenance of pavements, widening 
pavements, enhanced protection and 
security of pedestrians 
Cycling  Provide maximum possibilities for people to 
cycle: traffic calming, well marked and 
maintained cycle lanes and routes, priority 
systems, secure parking spaces and driver 
education 
Private cars General principles 
 
 
 
 
Cars can be used easily where access or 
convenience more than any other mode and 
where unmitigated external costs not 
imposed on others; inhibiting car use to be 
done ensuring maximum compensating 
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Safety 
benefits regarding other modes and 
improved quality of life 
Measures to reduce the effects of accidents: 
vehicle and road design and construction 
improvements, traffic management and 
control, educating for better road user 
behaviour 
Freight  Potential for out-of-town distribution depots, 
but solutions for freight transport not as well 
thought through as those for personal 
transport. Lorries have much to gain from 
reduced congestion, though 
Other priority users  Emergency vehicles could be slowed by 
traffic calming measures but assisted by bus 
lanes and other traffic management 
schemes 
New roads  Roads policy to be linked to realistic and 
acceptable amounts of traffic and completely 
consistent with other aspects of transport 
policy; some new construction – for example 
for new residential or industrial 
developments – inevitable but in general 
building new roads should be considered 
last rather than first 
Institutional and financial 
implications 
 Implementation of road pricing to make 
users the dominant funders of all transport 
expenditures; institution(s) needed to allow 
the coordination of policies and the 
consistent treatment of different modes 
 
Table 1. Principal elements of the policy package advanced by the New Realism. Source: assembled 
from Goodwin et al., 1991.  
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A New Deal for 
Transport 
Transport 2010 The Future of Transport Delivering a Sustainable 
Transport System 
We need a transport 
system which supports our 
policies for more jobs and 
a strong economy, which 
helps increase prosperity 
and tackles social 
exclusion. We also need a 
transport system which 
doesn’t damage our health 
and provides a better 
quality of life now - for 
everyone - without passing 
onto future generations a 
poorer world. This is what 
we mean by sustainable 
transport and why we 
need a New Deal… 
[This means we need to] 
achieve transport that is 
safe, efficient, clean and 
fair… 
[and] create a transport 
system that meets the 
needs of people and 
business at an affordable 
cost and produces better 
places in which to live and 
work. 
Our vision for transport in 
this country is for a 
modern, safe, high 
quality network that 
better meets people’s 
needs and offers more 
choice to individuals, 
families, communities 
and businesses... 
 
[We want to] benchmark 
our performance against 
the best in Europe and, 
through greatly increased 
investment, to transform 
our transport 
infrastructure over the 
next ten years… 
 
[At the same time we 
want] to lessen the 
impact of transport on the 
environment at both 
global and local levels. 
We need a transport 
network that can meet 
the challenges of a 
growing economy and 
the increasing demand 
for travel, but can also 
achieve our 
environmental objectives. 
We want our transport 
system:  
 
to support national economic 
competitiveness and growth, 
by delivering reliable and 
efficient transport networks;  
 
to reduce transport’s 
emissions of carbon dioxide 
and other greenhouse 
gases, with the desired 
outcome of tackling climate 
change;  
 
to contribute to better safety, 
security and health and 
longer life expectancy by 
reducing the risk of death, 
injury or illness arising from 
transport, and by promoting 
travel modes that are 
beneficial to health;  
 
to promote greater equality 
of opportunity for all citizens, 
with the desired outcome of 
achieving a fairer society; 
and  
 
to improve quality of life for 
transport users and non-
transport users, and to 
promote a healthy natural 
environment 
 
Table 2. Social, economic and environmental ‘headline’ aims of government transport policy strategy 
documents, 1998-2009. Sources: DETR, 1998, 2000; DfT, 2004, 2008a). Subservient aims were 
categorised, broadly and in no particular order, as economic development, social exclusion, environment, 
public transport, walking and cycling, safety, and integration. 
Category Target Comments Data refer to On course to meet target? 
Overall “Far fewer journeys 
by car and far more 
journeys by public 
transport” 
The number of car/van/taxi trips fluctuated but remained more or less 
constant, although distance travelled rose from 642 bpkm to 679 
bpkm in 2008 (+5.8%). Passenger rail journeys increased from 931m 
to 1274m (+33.3%) and bpkm increased from 38,472m to 50,698m 
(+32.8%). Light rail journeys increased from 113m to 203m (+79.6%) 
and bpkm increased from 675m to 1,191m (+76.4%); bus journeys fell 
from 2,510m to 2,440m (-2.9%) while vehicle kilometres remained 
more or less constant 
GB 
 
GB 
 
England 
England (not 
London) 
Not really 
Rail 50% growth in 
passenger kilometres 
Increased year on year from 38,472m to 50,698m (+32.8%) GB No 
 80% growth in freight 
kilometres 
Increased from 18.2bfkm to 20.6bfkm (+16.7%); peaked at 21.9bfkm 
in 2006/07 
GB No 
 Real reductions in the 
cost of rail travel 
Real cost of rail travel increased year on year 2000-2008 (+33.1%) GB No 
 Increased reliability
and punctuality 
 Public Performance Measure increased from 87.8% to 90.6%, 
although the Hatfield crash in 2000 severely affected performance 
throughout the decade (the PPM fell to 79.1% in 2000/01 and did not 
recover to 1999/2000 levels until 2006/07) 
GB Mostly 
 Improved levels of 
passenger 
satisfaction with 
services 
From a 2001 base, positive perceptions regarding the overall journey, 
punctuality and reliability, frequency of trains and information have all 
steadily increased. Only perceptions of value for money have become 
less favourable, and even then only marginally so, although from a 
base of just over 40% this was never a particularly well-received 
aspect of rail policy  
GB Mostly 
 Light rail passenger 
journeys at least 
doubled by 2010 
Increased year on year from 113m to 203m (+79.6%) despite 
spectacularly failing even to attempt to achieve planned investment in 
25 new lines 
England Unlikely  
Bus A 10% increase in 
passenger journeys 
by 2010 
Fallen from 2,510m to 2,440m (-2.9%). Trough of 2,315m in 2005/06, 
and recent recovery to do with the introduction of a nationwide 
concessionary fare scheme (see below) 
England (not 
London) 
No 
 Reduce average age 
of bus fleet to 8 years 
Average age 8.2 years in 2007/08 GB Unlikely 
 Better quality, less 
polluting, more 
accessible buses 
Condition of buses satisfied 80% of users in 2000/01 and 82% in 
2007/08; C02 emissions 0.00125 tonnes/km in 1997/98 and 0.00107 
tonnes/km in 2007/08 (-14.4%); responses for those with a disability 
(in relation to accessibility of buses) only sought from 2006/07    
England ‘Qualified’ yes 
 At least half-fare 
discounts for 
pensioners and the 
disabled 
Free travel for these groups introduced at local authority level in 2006 
and nationally in 2008 
England Yes 
 Improved levels of 
customer satisfaction 
with the quality of 
services 
Increased from 79% in 2000/01 to 82% in 2007/08 England Yes 
 Integrated Traveline introduced to provide integrated information; PlusBus to a England Partly 
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information, ticketing 
and booking, 
including smartcard
ticketing 
 
certain extent allows integrated rail and bus ticketing; contracts to 
develop smartcard ‘back offices’ only let in 2010 
Walking and 
 cycling
Treble the number of 
 cycling trips from their
2000 level 
Number of cycling trips fluctuated but had fallen by around 4% by 
2008  
GB No 
 Safer cycling and 
walking routes, 
particularly around 
schools 
Pedestrians killed reduced from 857 to 572; cyclists killed reduced 
from 127 to 115. Pedestrian stats represent a genuine reduction over 
time but cycling figures reveal no clear trend. KSIs decreased year on 
year for adult and child categories of pedestrians (6,112 to 4,724 and 
3,226 to 1,784) and cyclists (2,172 to 2,101 and 950 to 417)  
GB Generally yes 
Roads 
 
Reduction in 
congestion on inter-
urban trunk roads to 
5% below current 
levels by 2010 
Delays for slowest 10% of journeys, expressed as average vehicle 
delay in minutes per 10 miles (!), decreased from 3.8 in 2004 to 3.58. 
Most recent reductions likely associated with the economic downturn 
England Unclear 
 Congestion in larger 
urban areas reduced 
by 8%; Congestion in 
other urban areas 
congestion growth 
reduced from 15% to 
7% 
Average speeds in the 18 largest English urban areas outside London 
decreased from 21.8mph (1999/2000) to 20.9mph (2006) at peak 
times, and from 26 to 24mph for the same years at off-peak times   
England No 
 Road condition
maintained to a high 
standard: proportion 
requiring 
maintenance held at 
7-8% 
   Unclear 
Environment Contribute to meeting 
climate change 
targets to reduce 
greenhouse gas 
emissions 
Domestic transport emissions rose from 124.1mtC02 in 2000 to 
131.4mtC02 in 2007 
GB No 
 Accelerated take-up 
of cleaner vehicles to 
reduce air pollution 
and CO2 emissions 
Happened by default as a result of advancing technology GB Yes 
Safety 40% reduction in the 
number of people 
killed or seriously 
injured in road 
accidents 
All road users killed decreased from 3,423 to 2,538 although there 
was no drop below 3,400 until 2004; KSIs reduced year on year from 
44,255 to 28,572 (-35.4%) 
GB Likely to come close 
 50% reduction in the
num er of children 
killed or seriously 
injured in road 
accid nts 
Child p destri n and cyclist KSIs fell more-or-less year on year from 
4,407 to 2,201 (-50%) 
GB Yes 
So ial 
exclusion 
One-third inc ease in 
proportion of rural 
households livi g
ithin around 10 
minutes’ walk of an 
hourly (or better) bus 
service 
Proportion living within 13 minutes’ walk of an hourly or better bus 
service increased from 41% in 1998/2000 to 56% in 2008 (+36.6%). 
Whether this represents a steady upwards trend is uncl a  
England Yes 
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Table 3. Performance against key targets in Transport 2010: The Ten Year Plan. The ‘overall’ target was not included in the Plan and relates to an 
earlier quote by John Prescott; it is included here for reference (see text). Figures for comparisons are from 1999 or 1999/2000 and 2008 or 
2008/09 unless otherwise noted. Sources: (DfT, 2008b; DfT, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c, 2009d).  
 
Note 
1. This comparison is slightly awkward since it doesn’t include London Underground but does include buses in London, which are under TfL’s 
jurisdiction and have seen a 66% growth in passenger numbers since 1999/2000. We have included London buses because almost all of London’s 
rail services and the DLR appear in the National / Light Rail figures. 
 
Political Economic Social Technological Environmental Legal 
Short termist, 
incremental 
political culture  
Ideological 
fixation with 
privatisation 
and 
competition  
Car owning 
democracy / 
consumerist 
attitudes to 
transport 
No ‘technological 
fix’ yet apparent 
despite faith in 
one appearing 
Carbon 
emissions and 
climate change 
policy agenda 
Response to 
climate change 
from European 
and global 
institutions 
Lack of political 
will for radical 
change, ostrich 
mentality  
Treasury 
attitude to 
value of 
transport to the 
functioning of 
the economy  
Individualism 
and the ‘right to 
mobility’ (e.g. 
the freedom to 
fly) 
Appraisal and 
modelling 
techniques 
limited and can 
be manipulated 
Impact of climate 
change on 
transport 
infrastructure 
Constitutional 
issues: 
devolution, 
potential 
independence, 
etc. 
Civil service 
risk aversion  
Debates over 
increasing 
costs of 
congestion  
Feminisation 
and increasing 
complexity of 
transport 
demand 
Reliance on 
expertise of 
consultancies 
and financial 
sector who have 
their own agenda 
Uncertain impact 
of emissions 
trading 
Developing law in 
areas pertaining 
to transport, i.e. 
regulation 
Power and 
influence of 
transport and 
other vested 
interest groups  
Capital 
rationing  
Evolving lifestyle 
trends 
Project 
complexity 
Local area air 
quality issues 
Health and Safety 
and DDA 
legislation 
impacts on 
procurement 
costs 
Conflicts 
between 
ministers / 
departments 
over resource 
allocation 
Globalisation of 
world economy  
Social exclusion 
and polarisation 
Internet and ICT 
changing 
patterns of 
physical mobility 
Links between 
transport, activity 
patterns and 
public health 
Human Rights 
legislation and 
resulting new 
obligations on 
government and 
transport 
providers 
Effectiveness 
and / or 
personal 
inclinations of 
incumbent 
transport 
minister(s) 
High cost of 
crude oil 
(Transport 
2010 assumed 
barrels would 
fall to $16 by 
2005!) 
Fear of crime / 
anti-social 
behaviour 
Quality and 
attractiveness of 
car industry 
products, and 
persuasiveness 
of their 
marketing 
Continuing urban 
sprawl as a 
response to 
demographic 
and lifestyle 
change 
Land-use 
planning 
legislation 
Attitudes and 
electoral 
importance of 
‘Middle 
England’  
Overcrowding 
in the south 
east of 
England; lack 
of coherent 
central 
government 
regional policy  
NIMBYism Car efficiency 
gains lost 
through 
purchase of 
bigger/more 
powerful vehicles 
  
Complicated 
and 
fragmented 
governance 
structures  
Renewed 
prosperity of 
major 
provincial cities 
    
Inconsistencies 
between local 
and national 
priorities  
     
Politicians 
overawed by 
private sector 
and hold dim 
view of public 
sector’s ability 
to deliver  
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Terrorism / 
security 
environment  
     
 
Table 4. PESTEL analysis of influences and constraints on transport policy making. Source: Shaw and 
Docherty, 2008.  
Table 5. 2009 opinion poll of policy issues regarded as important to Britain today. Source: Ipsos MORI, 
2010. 
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Figure 1. Identification of transport as ‘an important issue facing Britain today’ over time Source: Ipsos-
Mori, 2010. 
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